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Abstract 
Companies of all sizes operating in all markets are moving toward cloud computing for 
greater flexibility, efficiency, and cost savings. The decision of how to adopt the cloud is 
a question of major security concern due to the fact that control is relinquished over 
certain portions of the IT ecosystem. This thesis presents the position that the main 
security decision in moving to cloud computing is choosing which type of cloud to 
employ for each portion of the network – the hybrid cloud approach. Vulnerabilities that 
exist on a public cloud will be explored, and recommendations on decision factors will be 
made for which specific types of systems to harbor inside a private cloud. Picking the 
best location for each system allows risk to be managed and sensitive information to be 
protected while at the same time providing a cost effective option. 
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Cumulonimbus Computing Concerns 
Information Security in Public, Private, and Hybrid Cloud Computing 
Purpose 
As personal data is being moved into and processed by computing systems on the 
Internet, security is paramount. For most people, data that is the key to their identity, 
financial, and social wellbeing is in the hands of numerous companies and these 
companies’ computer systems. These entities range from banks to insurance companies to 
stock markets to even retail stores. All these companies have a duty to protect their 
customers by protecting their data. 
To fully understand the issue at stake, this thesis will first dive into the issue of 
what defines a cloud and then examine how organizations would benefit from moving to 
the cloud in the first place. Defining what constitutes a cloud is important because then a 
company can realize how to reap the benefits of cloud computing without necessarily 
deciding to utilize a pre-packaged, public cloud offering. Once it is established that 
certain benefits can be gained from using the cloud for computing resources, this paper 
will raise some cautions about security risks in the cloud world, especially with regards to 
public clouds. Then the conclusion will give suggestions about how to both reap the 
benefits from the cloud model while at the same time how not to substantially increase 
risk in the area of security. 
This thesis will take the position that the main security decision of cloud 
computing is which type of cloud, namely deployment model and service model, will be 
used. The decision can eliminate whole categories of security risks but at the same time 
increase responsibilities of the organization. Achieving the correct balance with this issue 
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can be accomplished through the use of hybrid clouds with strong segmentation between 
the public and private components. Also, this paper will expound upon some of the best 
practices to attempt to mitigate the security concerns if public cloud is the choice taken. 
Background 
The starting point in this discussion of cloud computing security prompts the 
explanation of what is cloud computing, exactly. To begin, this thesis will look at the 
aspects of cloud computing as defined by the NIST and then will move on to how these 
aspects can be beneficial to companies leveraging the cloud. 
NIST Definition 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines cloud computing as 
follows: 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction. (NIST, 2011) 
This definition captures the essential characteristics of cloud computing while not 
excluding legitimate cloud computing manifestations that might not come to mind right 
away. The first thing most people think of in relation to the words “cloud computing” is 
along the lines of Amazon Web Services’ EC2, which stands for Elastic Compute Cloud. 
Other forms of cloud computing are vastly different in terms of business model and 
deployment, but they still fit the essential definition. For example, a business could make 
an on-premise private cloud in which they purchase all the hardware themselves instead 
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of renting space from a cloud provider. As long as the 5 qualifications of on-demand self-
service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service 
are met, then the deployment qualifies as cloud computing (NIST, 2011).  The importance 
of having the correct picture of what actually defines a cloud is that a company can 
evaluate if they can provide those money-saving and agility-providing qualities 
themselves instead of having to outsource to a possibly less secure organization. 
On-Demand Self-Service. This includes provisioning and configuring computing 
resources, whether they be virtual machines, storage pools, or network topology and 
routing. One of the benefits of the cloud is fluidity with regards to the ability to deploy 
certain programs on specific computing and network architectures. This characteristic of 
cloud computing is what realizes that benefit. 
Broad Network Access. Cloud computing provides services which are accessed 
and used over the network. Other than datacenter maintenance, there is not a need to 
physically be in the same location as the servers making up the cloud. Whether the 
resource is an RDP connection, database connection, or HTTP session; they are all 
accessed over the network. This quality provides enormous flexibility in how a cloud is 
implemented while keeping the same end-user view. 
Resource Pooling. One of the major reasons to move to cloud system usage is the 
increased utilization and server density gained by resource pooling. This drives down 
initial purchase cost, ongoing electrical usage cost, and datacenter size (Pearce, Zeadally, 
& Hunt, 2013). Resource pooling also easily accommodates vastly different sized 
instances of servers and applications in terms of capacity. For example, a development 
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server doesn’t need nearly the resource allocation that a production version of the same 
server averaging 1,000 concurrent users would require. 
Rapid Elasticity. Resource pooling goes hand in hand with elasticity. Because the 
cloud is virtualized, boundaries of where one physical server starts and another ends are 
not hard constraints in provisioning systems. This gives the possibility for servers and 
applications to be dynamically resized. 
Measured Service. Cloud services are provisioned for performance management 
and are priced (if renting from a cloud provider) by the amount of resources allocated to a 
specific host, network, or business account. In order to effectively accomplish this, a 
metering service must exist to both control the amount of resources allocated and to 
record the resources used. Even if the company owns the cloud rather than rents it, 
measured service is still needed to accurately provision the desired resource allocation. 
Reasons to Move to the Cloud 
The characteristics of a cloud computing system discussed in the previous section 
translate into major benefits in the areas of cost, flexibility, and performance. This section 
will look at the issue of moving to the cloud more from a business approach as well as 
from an operations view. The business focus will be primarily on issues such as the 
following: “how can we keep costs down?” and “will we be able to add this new web 
feature marketing wants?”  Operations’ viewpoint is more concerned with moving 
applications between development and production networks with differing security 
approaches, continuous integration, and similar issues. The flexibility the cloud offers can 
be a win for both teams. 
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Cost Savings. The primary reason some companies move to a cloud model is for 
cost savings due to higher efficiency usage of computing resources. Virtualization allows 
more than one virtual server for each physical server, thus increasing utilization while at 
the same time allowing flexibility for the times when one virtual server’s resource needs 
spike. Dell states in their report, “Evaluating the Useful Life of a Server,” that servers 
with the capabilities for virtualization do cost slightly more (around 22%) due to 
improved components to handle the additional computing needs of the virtual servers, but 
make that cost up with savings in other areas. The author states that “their higher energy 
efficiency and smaller footprint, however, meant 27% less overall facilities cost, and even 
modest virtualization improvements reduced the number of servers by half” (Nolle, 
2012). 
Cloud services need not be necessarily on-site or completely off-site utilizing a 
hosting provider, but a detailed look at total cost of ownership (TCO) is necessary when 
evaluating which is better. According to the same report, the median cost of a server is 
$1500-1600, but the power/cooling and maintenance costs were $790 and $940 
respectively over the server’s four year lifespan. These add up to $1730, about $200 more 
than the cost of the server itself. These costs, plus the additional personnel salaries for a 
datacenter and virtualization management team, drive up the operational price of the 
servers even further. 
Third-party cloud service providers manage all these aspects and charge the 
subscriber a fixed rate for the use of certain amounts of provisioned virtualized resources. 
Because cloud companies have put vast effort into streamlining and automating processes 
as well as splitting those overhead costs among many tenants, they can offer services at a 
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more cost-efficient rate than that of most other companies trying to do the job themselves. 
Additionally, large startup costs can be avoided and small amounts can be paid along the 
way. “Cloud computing will have a profound impact on the cost structure of all the 
industries, turning some of the fixed costs into marginal costs of production” (Mitchell & 
Meggison, 2014). That idea brings the discussion to the next aspect, agility. 
Agility. The second reason companies find moving to the cloud attractive is for 
increased agility in their operations. This can happen in several ways. One is flexibility in 
using computing resources rather than being required to own all computing resources and 
only have some utilized at certain times of peak business. Another is giving up both 
control and management of other areas of the software stack. In that case, a company 
decides to use Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as a Service (PaaS) instead of 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). An example of using SaaS is a company signing a 
contract with Microsoft to use Outlook.com email rather than hosting and managing 
email services on their own. More detail about these will be provided in the section below 
titled “Service Models.” 
Most pieces of software designed to be accessed by many people at the same time 
will need some sort of scalability. This is especially true of modern web apps like Gmail 
where the number of concurrent users might be in the millions. Even the most powerful 
single server build could not handle that load, so horizontal scalability (as opposed to 
vertical scalability) is what must be implemented. With horizontal scalability, new servers 
are added as the load increases, and the load is spread out among them. Clearly the cloud 
is the perfect methodology for realizing this goal. A virtual machine can be cloned, 
provisioned, deployed, and added to the main load balancer in an automated fashion, and 
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almost instantly a new level of capacity is added to the application. Digital Ocean, a 
public cloud provider aimed at developers, touts, “Deploy an SSD cloud server in 55 
seconds” (2015). This type of quick deployment can be used for load following 
applications. 
Besides the time-based agility cloud services provide, third-party cloud hosting 
providers can also provide resource elasticity beyond what a company has in their 
datacenter on a regular basis. For example, a small online retailer trying to make a big 
marketing push on Black Friday might need four times the normal resource allotment. 
Financially it doesn’t make sense to incur a large expense to scale up infrastructure for 
less than one week each year. At non-peak times those computing resources are still 
costing the company money but are going to waste. A company leveraging the cloud 
would pay to rent those systems only for the one day sale and then scale back to their 
normal business level for the rest of the year. This is a much better solution. Now that the 
benefits of cloud computing have been shown, the options relating to cloud types will be 
examined. 
Types of Cloud Computing 
The position of this thesis is that the most fundamental security decision when 
using the cloud is picking which of the many types of cloud offerings to use for a specific 
purpose. Decisions in the area of service model and deployment model can mitigate 
entire categories of risks; but at the same time, they require certain responsibilities to 
mitigate other risks. At a very high level, the service model determines how much of the 
software stack a client company controls, and the deployment model choice dictates how 
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much of the physical computing hardware the company oversees. Both of these control 
decisions are security related issues. 
Service Models 
There are three service models that cloud computing can follow. From a technical 
perspective, most types of applications can be deployed in any of the three methods. It 
then becomes a business decision which one a company chooses to use depending on 
their in-house expertise, the amount of human resources they can dedicate to the problem, 
and the amount of security and control needed around the data associated with the app. 
Moving from one side of the spectrum to the other, there is a trend of more to less control 
over the underlying architecture. For specific purposes this can either be a good or a bad 
thing. Only needing to configure the application, or even having to write custom code, is 
a much more focused scope than managing the server-level infrastructure on which the 
application runs. Figure 1 below gives an understanding of how each of these models 
differs from the others. 
 
Figure 1: Cloud Hosting Models was removed for open source publishing. See figure 1-2 in 
Windows Azure Hybrid Cloud (Garber, Malik, & Fazio, 2013). 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Infrastructure as a Service is possibly the 
most well-known iconic type of service when someone thinks of “the cloud.”  Basically it 
is provisioned virtual servers that the customers can log into and configure however they 
would like within certain limitations. Functionally IaaS acts much the same way as a 
physical server sitting in the company’s datacenter. Patch management, application 
runtime environment installation and setup, and application installation are all done by 
the customer. The portions managed by the vendor are only the datacenter virtualization 
aspects, networking, and usually OS imaging on deployment. All three of these service 
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models will have tradeoffs in control vs. time and expertise spent doing management. 
IaaS is fully on the control and customization side; the customer is in charge of managing 
most everything about the virtual host. 
The book Windows Azure Hybrid Cloud by Danny Garber, Jamal Malik, and 
Adam Fazio presents a good analogy for each of the service models by comparing them 
to methods of transportation. Starting off, buying one’s own car is the traditional 
corporate datacenter approach. The company is in charge of research and procurement of 
specific models of servers, networking gear, and datacenter equipment (racks, cooling 
systems, etc.). One step away from that is leasing a car, the IaaS cloud option. With a 
lease, you have basically the same responsibilities as if the car were your own, but it isn’t. 
Another parallel with IaaS and leasing is the asset depreciation. Just as cars have a 
limited lifetime, servers do as well. Leasing a server for two years will take away almost 
half of its usable life, so your lease cost covers their replacement fund, server hardware 
maintenance, network connection, and people to manage the hardware layer of 
infrastructure (i.e. replacing failed hard drives in a SAN.)  The point of the cloud is to 
manage the provisioning in an automated fashion as much as possible so salaried humans 
don’t have to do the job. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS). Platform as a Service is the level on which 
developers work. Referring to Figure 1 again, it includes the network/storage layer, the 
virtualization layer, the operating system layer, as well as the runtime layer. This allows 
custom code to be easily deployed to the cloud server. The hosting provider’s cloud 
management solution takes care of routing and isolating the tenants, managing the 
underlying runtime engines, as well as sometimes supporting dynamic, load-based 
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scalability. The customer has complete control over the code he or she deploys, but that is 
basically the only operation that is done on the infrastructure: deploy. The specific other 
components of the system are provided, whether that is standard filesystem storage, SQL 
databases, NoSQL databases, network I/O. IaaS generally allocates a specific amount of 
allocated hardware (i.e. number of CPUs, amount of RAM, disk space) that is the client’s 
to do whatever he or she wants, where PaaS usually provides whatever services are 
needed and charges a small charge for a certain number of operations. For example, with 
Google App Engine, NoSQL database operations are $0.06 per 100k read or write ops 
and $0.18/GB per month (Google, Inc., 2015). Examples of these PaaS providers are the 
aforementioned Google App Engine, Red Hat OpenShift, Heroku, and Windows Azure. 
The analogous operation to Platform as a Service in the transportation world is a 
rental car. A person can pick it up and drive wherever he or she wants (deploy whatever 
code), but at the same time doesn’t have to worry about doing routine engine 
maintenance and fixing emergency problems (like routine patching & configuration and 
conflicts due to those actions). The cloud service provider manages those lower levels of 
infrastructure in their own automated way. PaaS is the middle ground on the spectrum of 
control versus handing off duties. 
Software as a Service (SaaS). Software as a Service is the highest level approach 
to cloud applications. A client will contract with a provider to have the provider’s 
software made available to the client, and the client will pay for the amount of usage that 
will be required. Normally this is on a per-account or per-user basis. Many people will 
sometimes think of these services as just “websites” when they, in reality, are Software as 
a Service cloud apps. An example of an application that would fall into this category is 
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email hosting on Microsoft’s Outlook.com. This approach takes most all of the technical 
management concerns away from the client company and lets the hosting company take 
care of these aspects. The client company’s responsibility is to customize the software 
settings made available by the SaaS provider. In the case of cloud-based email service, 
those client-controlled aspects would be the Active Directory settings, group 
organization, etc. 
To complete the analogy, Software as a Service is similar in usage to a public 
transit system. With public transit, the individual user does not have much control over 
the scheduling or routes – he just has to make do with the limited flexibility that is 
provided. He is left to choose which of the available routes and departure times works the 
best for him. On the flip side, the ordeal is extremely simple – there are no worries about 
how to repair the bus if it breaks or even any of the challenges of driving in a crowded 
city. 
Deployment Models 
Any cloud service model discussed above can be realized on most any 
deployment model explained in this section. Having the wide variety of combinations 
available allows for picking the solution that best fits the situation. What is crucial in 
cloud security is to select the right type of service and deployment model to fit the need 
while still being secure. The remainder is following the security best practices associated 
with the chosen service model. 
Public Cloud. The general idea of a public cloud is each provisioned virtual 
machine is on the same network as everybody else – every machine is exposed to the 
Internet. Later this paper will discuss ways a public cloud can be secured, but in general 
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this is the least secure form of external party cloud hosting. On the flip side, it also has 
the lowest cost for a given amount of computing power. 
Public cloud providers are often huge, owning hardware that would allow tens of 
thousands of virtual machines to run at the same time. These massive amounts of 
resources are available to whichever company or individual person would like to rent 
them. Consequently any given entity’s “neighbors” in the cloud could be comprised of 
companies in the same industry, small startup companies, hobbyists, as well as hackers. 
Allowing hackers to get so close to important infrastructure is generally a very bad idea, 
but there are certain situations where the security requirements can still be met, and the 
benefit of reduced cost wins. 
Figure 2, from the NIST’s Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, 
depicts the groups of clients using the cloud resources as well as the public cloud logical 
setup. In a public cloud security has to be more weighted toward the host itself since the 
network environment around it is more hostile. This diagram shows how there can be a 
boundary controller (like a VPN concentrator) that would allow a secure location like a 
business branch office to have a more privileged level of access to the cloud computing 
resources than the level of access attainable from being beside the specific cloud-based 
host within the cloud network. Also the diagram calls out the maintenance the cloud 
hosting provider does on their own hardware (with the “new hardware in” and “old 
hardware out” arrows.)  This would otherwise be functions the business would be 
required to perform but now of which are relieved. 
 
Figure 2: Public Cloud was removed for open source publishing. See section 4, figure 1 from 
NIST Special Publication 800-146 at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-146/sp800-
146.pdf (NIST, 2012). 
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Private Cloud. The complete opposite side of the spectrum from a public cloud is 
a private cloud. This is a cloud for only one client organization, and that organization has 
full control over the cloud structure. Because there are no other clients using it, they can 
control all aspects of the network, firewalls, and other protections to their liking. Also, the 
cloud is under only the owning company’s physical control, which reduces the possibility 
of certain types of attacks. This type of cloud can be made the most secure of any, but if 
the company’s IT is not mature, they are getting rid of the cloud service provider, which 
might be a small last line of defense or alert in the case of an attack. 
Private clouds are in essence a very high level of virtualization flexibility in a 
company’s own datacenter. As a result, some of the benefits of the cloud are not 
displayed in as magnified a way as with a public cloud. This is because, unless the 
company is extremely large, the 1) management overhead is about the same as if cloud 
was not used, and 2) the datacenter will have a more limited cap in the amount to which it 
can scale at a moment’s notice. In a public cloud there are so many tenants that it is very 
unlikely that all will experience a peak usage surge at exactly the same time. The public 
cloud company must have enough to handle its largest tenants’ peak usage, so it will have 
a respectable amount of free resources at any given time. Other clients benefit from this 
availability. One the other hand, companies with their own datacenter might not have the 
money to buy extra hardware “for just in case” when there’s not an immediate business 
reason to buy it. 
That being said, private clouds not only have the advantage of the owner being 
able to configure just the way the owning organization would like but also the fact that 
the traffic on the internal network of the cloud can be more trusted because physical 
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control of the network is maintained. It can be argued that the computers still need to be 
just as secure as if they were on the public Internet if they are sitting on a private network 
with firewalled access, but in reality, no CIO would feel comfortable letting a hacker just 
walk in and get on the internal database subnet of the network 24/7. One last detail about 
private clouds is that they can either be on premise or located at a trusted, audited 3rd 
party hosting provider location. 
One more twist on a private cloud is now the existence of “virtual private clouds” 
(Amazon Web Services, 2015). These are run in a multi-tenant public cloud datacenter 
like a normal public cloud, but the network is logically separated from the Internet. 
Rather than attaching a VM directly to the Internet, it is put on a private IP network range 
of which the client organization has control over subnets, ACLs, and specifically 
configured chosen public Internet access. This type of cloud has the separation from the 
Internet available in a private cloud, but still does not maintain physical control over the 
hardware, which leaves the possibility of tampering open. 
Community Cloud. Community clouds are an interesting concept that tries to 
combine the best aspects of public and private clouds into a single entity. Public clouds 
are an “everyone is welcome” party, where private clouds are just the one organization, 
but that organization does not have access to some of the benefits that come about when 
many companies share the same resource pool. Organizations with similar goals and 
security postures will band together to make a shared data center. This is especially 
common when several organizations have the same legal regulatory requirements. 
Several credit card processing companies could come together and make a PCI compliant 
datacenter, or a couple of healthcare organizations could build a HIPAA compliant 
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community cloud. In this model, it is financially possible to have larger non-utilized 
pools to handle spikes in need but at the same time be able to trust the co-tenants. 
Hybrid Cloud. While the community cloud concept combines aspects of public 
and private clouds into one physical datacenter, the hybrid cloud takes a different 
approach to achieving the benefits of both public and private clouds. In a hybrid cloud, 
each server or application is analyzed and given a verdict whether its security 
requirements dictate that it needs to go in a private cloud or if it is acceptable to put it in a 
public cloud. In the end, some companies might be split with more in public and others 
might keep more in a private cloud, but both can gain the advantages wherever possible. 
Those apps and servers that were put in the public cloud can take advantage of the cost 
savings, and those in the private cloud can have the benefit of being in a more secure, 
known environment. The main concept of this thesis is how to effectively use a hybrid 
cloud setup to achieve the best balance between security and cost savings offered by the 
cloud. 
Cloud Security Concerns 
Security issues in the cloud can be divided roughly into two categories: technical 
issues like the quality of the hypervisor doing logical provisioning of resources on the 
same physical host, and human issues such as problems caused by lack of due diligence 
in overlooking the details of a system’s design or operation. Both of these can lead to 
avenues of attack with the same end result of causing huge problems in the information 
security CIA triad. 
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Technical 
The technical concerns for security mainly have to do with the ability to 
eavesdrop on various portions of the data flow in a typical business scenario. The three 
types of eavesdropping covered in this section are disk access (data at rest), processing 
access (data “in use”), and network access (data in motion). Any of these three can cause 
a severe breach of the CIA triad. 
Disk and Data Access. One of the major differences encountered when using a 
cloud hosted at a third party site is that the servers and network are no longer under the 
client company’s physical control. In a co-location situation, there might be thousands of 
virtual servers at a data center all sharing from the same or a few number of physical data 
stores. Because there are more virtual machines than data stores, logical provisioning is 
used to allocate virtual disks to the VMs. All of this data is able to be examined by some 
person or program with sufficient access. The steps necessary to gain access and 
manipulate hypervisor disk structure, including planting persistent backdoors, are 
described in ERNW’s February 2013 newsletter (Kuhn, 2013). Pulling of a VM escape 
attack is hard due to the fact that hypervisors have a relatively small code base that can be 
more thoroughly tested than larger operating systems. Kuhn also points out that it is 
harder to gain access to some files such as the /etc/passwd file because the hypervisor 
keeps those files in an exclusive access locked state. 
Besides just attacks from other tenants’ virtual machines, there is also a possibility 
of a much easier attack through someone with credentials to access the hypervisor itself. 
Access to the hypervisor is at a level below the guest operating system and can easily 
read or even modify the entire virtual disk contents. Tampering with the data on the 
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servers could cause major problems with the client’s business. However, with that there is 
a possibility that from some other reference perspective there will be a realization that the 
data has been modified and can then take action. On the other hand, just “spying” type 
read-only access might never be detected.  
The impact of this type of unauthorized access is huge! Confidentiality, 
Availability, and Integrity can all be breached in the given situation. Confidentiality is the 
first one to go with a more basic level of exploit: the revealing of information to the 
unauthorized party and possibly disclosure to an even broader group. Availability can be 
compromised if the data can be deleted or corrupted. Having backups can minimize the 
downtime, but still will not contain all the information lost. Integrity is an issue when 
data is modified to say something other than what it was supposed to say. This is a large 
problem, especially if the target system is an important database. 
Cloud backup and archival services are another portion of the cloud ecosystem 
where data at rest can be attacked. Companies will have data generated either from their 
machines in the cloud or even servers on site that will be fed into a cloud backup 
solution. The businesses can then take advantage of the virtually unlimited storage at a 
good price the cloud offers, and they also don’t have to maintain an offsite location to 
store the backups, but the main advantage is the redundancy. Amazon Glacier, one of 
these data archival services, designs for “average annual durability of 99.999999999% 
for an archive” (Amazon Web Services, 2015). This is more than even mid to large sized 
companies can do with their own storage and location resources. 
The next section will discuss mitigations to the problem of data leakage. The most 
common solution is to use encryption, but even then it must be done the correct way, and 
INFORMATION SECURITY CLOUD  21 
there are certain situations where it will not be feasible given another conflicting 
requirement.  
Data Processing. The attack against data while it is being processed is a similar 
situation in terms of how it can be achieved and the results. It would take more effort to 
glean a reasonable amount of information than just from viewing the results from disk, 
which makes it seem like an attack that would not happen as frequently. However, the 
counterbalance is that protecting data during processing is much more difficult than 
protecting it while it is sitting out in storage. In general the data must be in a plaintext, 
expanded form to be processed. 
There has been work done on this problem of the necessity of data to be in 
plaintext form in order to be processed. Homomorphic encryption is a type of encryption 
that allows data to be processed while it is in an encrypted state where the processor does 
not have the capability of decrypting it. At this point, it is mostly all theoretical work. 
Much research and time will be needed before homomorphic encryption is a business 
practical option. Craig Gentry’s doctoral dissertation is on this subject, which was 
presented at ACM’s 2009 Symposium on Theory of Computing. (Gentry, 2009)  One 
application of this and similar research is the ability to search and process encrypted data 
sets without giving anyone that was able to watch the processor perform the operations 
the actual data that was being manipulated. 
Network Sniffing. Like the previous two attacks in this section, the main 
opportunity for this attack is in a datacenter that is either hosted with a third party 
provider or where multiple companies are co-located in the same facility. Traffic going 
between two machines might be intercepted and monitored for information. While private 
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and virtual private clouds have logical separation between the traffic of different clients, 
flat public clouds can expose every machine straight onto the Internet. At that point 
anyone along the network could sniff transmissions. 
This problem, of the three, is by far the easiest to solve. Data can be received into 
the server in an encrypted form, decrypted, processed, and encrypted again on the server, 
and then sent back out. Even in a fully on-site corporate environment, best practice is to 
encrypt traffic on the network whenever possible. TLS, SSH, and VPN are musts in 
today’s business world! 
Human/Managerial Concerns 
Another whole domain of risks exist when using hosted cloud computing. The 
technical risks mentioned above are less and less possible from a purely technical exploit 
basis now that hypervisors have become more refined and standard in most all business 
areas. The results of those attacks can still happen, though, with misuse of authorized 
access rather than gaining unauthorized access through exploits. This section will explore 
some of those management concerns that can lead to a breach. 
Unknown Risk Profile. In order for a company to decide on adopting a particular 
strategy, they must first weigh the pros and cons in order to see if the move is 
worthwhile. If it fulfills the requirements set in place and would be a positive change, 
then the company has to do a risk assessment to see what risks are present. There is 
always some sort of risk in a plan, but it might be more or might be less than the previous 
methodology’s risk level. Some common terms related to risk are defined below (Threat 
Analysis Group, LLC, 2010): 
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• Asset: what an entity is trying to protect 
• Threat: what an entity is trying to protect against 
• Vulnerability: a weakness or gap in protection efforts 
• Risk: the intersection of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, A+T+V = R 
In cloud computing, assets and threats are relatively clear. The problem is that 
there are unknowns about the vulnerabilities in the mix. These vulnerabilities can be 
categorized and information found out about necessary conditions, but data is missing 
that tells the story of how and how often each one happens in the real world. In 
quantitative risk analysis, the cost of an event multiplied by the probability of the event 
occurring gives you an expected loss average. This method can already be hard to use 
since one has to put a dollar amount on a not directly cash related item (i.e. loss of 
customer data), but it is even further complicated when the probability of an event 
happening is not known accurately. Because the cloud is a relatively new occurrence, the 
historical data on threats like these is scarce. This is a challenge IT policymakers have to 
deal with when deciding whether to move into the cloud. 
Malicious Insiders. Rather than an attack themselves, malicious insiders are an 
attack vector. The people that manage the datacenter have a privilege level that is 
necessary to do their job, but could possibly give them access to client data they should 
not have access to. Their access can be used to perpetrate the attacks listed in the 
technical section. For example, network administrators regular sniff traffic along the 
networks to troubleshoot connection issues and re-route or re-design the network for 
higher performance. Rather than just looking at the traffic related to the problem at hand, 
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the administrator could also see other traffic going by and disclose that data if he so 
desired. 
Defenses against malicious insiders are generally a combination of the separation 
of duties and least privilege concepts. These mean that each administrator has a 
designated role and can only perform duties within his vertical “silo” (separation of 
duties) and that privileges within his “silo” of responsibility are only given to the height 
that is needed to perform job duties (least privilege). An example of this would be a 
network admin given privilege to sniff traffic in order to troubleshoot, but not allowed to 
modify traffic in transit. 
Insufficient Due Diligence. At the end of the day, it is still humans that are in 
charge of datacenter operations. They set the policies, make the base configurations, and 
set the on-demand changes. This is a very large responsibility, given that an error in 
configuration could impact the security of hundreds of client companies. Audits are very 
important as they can point out gaps in the high level policies or specific low level 
implementation. Responding to the audit findings and closing holes is a very important 
process in the ongoing improvement of the datacenter. 
The Cloud Security Alliance includes insufficient due diligence as one of the 
factors in their “Notorious Nine Top Cloud Computing Threats of 2013.”  It was ranked 
8th out of nine, but it was the only one where the graph of actual risk vs perceived risk 
had the actual risk over tripling perceived risk. This shows that organizations don’t 
consider this threat as closely as they need to. Moving to the cloud requires adding 
another group of people to the trust circle that has control over the information systems. 
Thus, it is important that the cloud service provider be worthy of that trust. 
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Here is an example of how it is the human factor that fails in many attack 
scenarios. Target suffered a breach in November of 2013 in which many customers’ credit 
card information was stolen. Fireeye, an intrusion detection system gave an alert that a 
threat “malware.binary” was found traversing the network. The security team didn’t 
perform incident response actions on the alert because it was a generic low information 
one. John Strand of Black Hills Information Security said, "Target is a huge organization. 
They probably get hundreds of these alerts a day" (Finkle & Heavey, 2014). Even though 
this incident wasn’t fully the security team’s fault, it shows how in the end, human 
decisions are what make or break situations. 
Restrictions on Penetration Testing. The last topic that will be discussed in this 
section are the additional hardships that are attached to testing information security in a 
public cloud. Penetration testing is an important step in the development lifecycle before 
deploying to production. A successful penetration test does not ensure an application is 
completely secure, but finding security vulnerabilities during the test does necessitate 
sending the application back and fixing it before it is deployed into active customer use. 
A challenge with cloud providers and penetration testing is that sometimes the line is 
blurry at what point the cloud service provider’s and the leasing customer’s 
responsibilities switch over (Jones, 2013). This is especially true with PAAS and SAAS 
because just as much or more of the full hardware and software stack is run by the 
hosting provider than the customer. 
Amazon and other cloud providers require advance notice and approval before 
allowing penetration tests to occur on VMs they host (Amazon Web Services, 2015). 
These hosting providers want to know that attack traffic floating around their networks is 
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authorized, and they want to ensure any attack traffic does not interfere with other 
companies’ machines. Also, AWS makes sure other customers are not forced to endure 
lower performance from one organization’s penetration test. Amazon says that their 
policy “does not permit testing m1.small or t1.micro instance types. This is to prevent 
potential adverse performance impacts on the resources you may be sharing with other 
customers in a multi-tenant environment.”  Although understandable requirements, these 
might limit what a company is able to do penetration testing wise with their servers. 
Security Approach 
This thesis has presented the some information on cloud types and security 
challenges faced by organizations moving IT services to the cloud. This concluding 
section deals with methodologies, mitigations, and management to work toward the best 
security possible in the cloud. 
Cloud Type Choice 
The first and probably most important aspect of the security plan in cloud 
computing is the choice of cloud type. There exists a large spectrum of options with 
cloud type, and all aspects of security, usability, and price must be taken into account 
when making a decision. The choice ranges from an on-site, private cloud where the IT 
staff of the owning company run everything, the most secure if the company knows what 
they are doing, to a public cloud where the security is a combination of inherently worse 
and unknown, but the cost is very low and management is offloaded. A risk management 
study needs to be done to see which service model and deployment model should be 
used. Specific situations may differ, but Figure 4 shows the conclusions of this research 
on the best security choice cloud types for specific tasks. 
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Type Private Cloud Community Cloud Public Cloud 
Security 
Summary 
Most secure Similar to private, slightly 
less secure 
Most unknowns, highest 
possibility for insecurity 
Possible 
Uses 
• Database with PII, 
payment, or login 
information 
• Protecting encryption 
keys (code signing, 
etc.) 
• Web apps, customer 
portals 
• When several 
companies in the 
same market sector 
come together 
• Public-facing website 
• Non-sensitive user 
services (i.e. news 
feed aggregation  and 
delivery) 
Figure 4: Cloud Type & Use Summary 
The deployment model choice affects what types of unauthorized access attacks 
are possible threats, but service models are chosen depending on the expertise of the IT 
employees a specific company has. If an organization is more lacking in the server 
hardening area, it would be a better solution to deploy code for a website on a PAAS. 
Then the PAAS product would take care of configuring server security instead of the less 
than knowledgeable company having to do it themselves. On the other hand, another 
company that has a very deep understanding of server hardening and containerization 
might want to configure their own servers because they trust themselves more than they 
trust another company’s configuration. The service model can be a security related 
decision if the organization either knows a great deal or very about securing the levels 
below the application in the software stack. If the company does not have a mature server 
security team, it would be better to let the service provider control that aspect, but if that’s 
where they excel and need an additional level of security, doing it in-house is better. In 
most cases, expertise levels will be similar or an edge to the cloud company, so it is just a 
management decision of whether or not the company wants to outsource that specific 
duty. 
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 When choosing a deployment model, it is not necessary to use only one model 
and be locked in to the benefits and risks of just that one. Generally the best strategy 
today is to employ multiple different types of clouds depending on the risk assessment of 
the component being served. According to Ziff David B2B, the majority of companies 
utilize more than one cloud type in their IT strategy: 29% are public cloud only, 7% are 
private cloud only, and 58% use a hybrid cloud approach (2014). For example, user data 
with credit card number should probably be stored in a high security private cloud or a 
third party PCI certified community cloud, but the non-portal portion of a public website 
could be easily hosted in a public cloud (IBM Global Technology Services, 2013). 
 An important aspect to remember in any network, and especially in a hybrid 
cloud, is to divide the network into different security zones. High security areas should be 
segmented off from lower security, less trusted ones. In the connection between public 
and private clouds, the public cloud should be treated at a level similar to a DMZ. The 
public cloud portion should have heavily firewalled access to only the resources 
necessary on the private cloud side, and those resources should be abstracted from the 
critical infrastructure, (i.e. application APIs with strict sanitization instead raw database 
connections.)  Having good segmentation in place allows companies to safely use both 
public and private clouds in concert to each do what they do best. 
Making the right decisions in the area of architecting public and private cloud 
portions of infrastructure can result in an optimal balance of cost efficiency and security. 
The most cost efficiency can be gained with the public cloud, and full control over 
security can be retained by the private cloud. Matching the company’s risk profile with 
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their desired risk appetite can determine where their computing needs would best be 
placed. 
 Public Cloud Host-Based Security 
Private clouds provide the most assurance of security for organizations that have 
the expertise necessary to manage it, but at some point, either due to cost benefits or lack 
of management expertise, a public cloud will be utilized. This section deals with 
protections that should be maintained in a public cloud environment, addressing the 
security issues presented in the section entitled “Cloud Computing Concerns.” 
Host-Based Firewalls. In a traditional data center or on-site private cloud, a 
reasonable amount of confidence could be assumed about the physical and logical 
protection of the network. In a public cloud, this might not be the case. Consequently, 
more security has to be baked into the hosts than might be needed in a traditional 
network. 
Host-based firewalls are always a good idea in addition to network-based 
firewalls in an internal corporate network, but in a public cloud setting, they are 
imperative. Networks that just rely on network-based firewalls are like an egg with a 
crunchy shell and soft inside, but in a public cloud sometimes that outer shell isn’t a 
possibility or is more limited in functionality. Host-based firewalls like Windows Firewall 
and iptables or firewalld on Linux can protect a single computer from all other computers 
on the network, whether those computers are friendly or malicious. 
Secure Service Configuration, Least Privilege. Trying to only let allowed traffic 
get to the host is a good first step, but hackers will eventually be able to squeeze 
malicious traffic through the allowed rules. This is where other internal host hardening 
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techniques come in to play. The first of these is locking down each service configuration 
so that it can perform all its duties without enlarging the attack surface any more than 
necessary. One important aspect of this is permissions. These can be in the form of 
database user permissions, filesystem permissions, or a newer variant: containerization. 
Containers will be used more and more in the future as a way of deployment management 
as doing a good job of security partitioning among different processes and services 
(Docker, Inc., 2014-2015). 
OS Hardening and Integrity Monitoring. Now that the network entry points 
and services have been secured, one last aspect is the operating system itself. There are 
multiple ways to secure the operating system. One of these is taking steps to harden the 
kernel with anti-exploitation techniques. This is different depending on the operating 
system. Linux will have options like Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and 
SELinux. These can be changed from their default state by using kernel flags. Microsoft 
has a free product called EMET, which stands for Enhanced Mitigation Experience 
Toolkit. It is a “shim” module that attempts to watch for and stop exploitation attempts 
before they reach the kernel (Microsoft, 2015). 
Another method for detecting break-ins and backdoors is deploying file integrity 
monitoring software such as Tripwire (2015). File integrity monitoring ensures that the 
configuration file is in the desired state in which it was left rather than being changed by 
an attacker to allow malicious activity. A database of the mandated correct configuration 
files and hashes is stored, and servers in production are compared on interval to the 
master spec. If an inspection finds servers that are misconfigured, an incident can be 
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opened to see if it was a deployment mistake or an intrusion attempt, and the root cause 
can be dealt with. 
Crypto Protections. Because one of the possible attack vectors in a public cloud 
was virtual disk access, an organization will do what is possible to protect their data 
through cryptography even if the disk can be read. Two major states in which data needs 
to be protected are in motion and at rest. Both are targeted by various attack vectors in 
cyber space. Cryptography can be used to protect the data in both situations, but it is 
implemented a different way (Lippard, 2013). 
Traffic cannot be assumed to be safe from sniffing or modification in transit 
between different servers on a public cloud or between servers and clients. When 
information leaves the host, it must be encrypted. This follows best practices and is not a 
difficult task to perform. TLS 1.2 is a good protocol for securing traffic between hosts, 
and IPsec is used for tunneling between private networks. SSL 3.0 is now publicly known 
as insecure due to the POODLE vulnerability and should not be used (United States 
Computer Emergency Rediness Team, 2014). 
Bruce Schneier states that encryption was originally invented to protect data in 
motion – a message being transmitted between two parties (2010). For data in motion, 
session keys can be created on the fly and transmitted through a key exchange protocol 
for usage in just that conversation. Data in rest has to use the same key over a period of 
time, which means the key must be stored somewhere where it is accessible to decrypt 
the data at the time it is needed. The key must be present on or near the system that is 
actually using the data, but it must be protected since it is what is being relied on to keep 
the data confidential. A common, cost-effective solution for secure data storage and 
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archival is to encrypt the data while on the private cloud, and then transfer it out to the 
public cloud for actual storage. Public clouds are generally cheaper and more 
geographically redundant than a small to mid-sized company’s private cloud, so the 
backups are actually less likely to be lost out on a public cloud, but following this model 
they are unreadable to even someone with direct disk access.  
Third Party Hosting Company 
Now the focus will move from securing each individual host to the last 
recommendation for a cloud security approach: picking the right third party hosting 
company. Having a trustworthy organization as your public cloud provider is a must. A 
good company in this role will do their best to ensure the possible threats discussed in the 
“Cloud Security Concerns” section do no happen. The two things to look for are a good 
technical configuration that can ensure your virtual machines are logically separated from 
other clients’ ones, and a good ranking on a comprehensive audit. 
Technical Configuration. This point of critique concerns the specific technical 
configuration with which the virtual machines will be deployed, however in most all 
cases, a hosting provider will not give a client their underlying infrastructure’s source 
code and configuration settings. Therefore it is somewhat hard to judge in how secure of 
a manner the datacenter is configured. Probably the best method to get an estimation of 
the technical skill of the company is to look at the number of servers it hosts on a day-to-
day basis, its employment size, and the level of qualification that is required for 
employment at that organization. 
Having a highly competent staff is a good sign, but the end goal is strong AAA 
(authentication, authorization, and accounting) and following the least privilege model 
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for all cloud access and management. Services should be designed in a way that allows 
only authorized people to have certain access under the least privilege model. This 
applies to both the hosting company setting up their hypervisors management as well as 
the company putting their IT in the cloud. Trust is a necessity in computing: using any 
hardware component or piece of software requires a level of trust in the people that made 
it. However more reliance should not be put on trust than has to be. Systems can be made 
more secure by using designs that do not require as many trust assumptions. 
An example of this in the real world is Lavabit, the encrypted email provider used 
by Edward Snowden. Moxie Marlinspike, a secure protocol researcher, published this 
analysis of Lavabit’s method of operation. (Marlinspike, 2013)  Even though it was a 
semi-widely acclaimed encrypted email service, there were some very fundamental trust 
assumptions that did not need to exist. These should actually be considered flaws in 
design. The most glaring one was that the private keys for each user were stored on the 
same set of servers as the actual email! Every time the user logged in with his passphrase, 
the server would take the passphrase it was given in plain text, decrypt the private key, 
and then use that to decrypt the email to show the user. All that needed to happen for the 
email service to be compromised was to permanently store the user’s passphrase the next 
time he logged in. This design had basically no customer protection. As long as the 
company respected the user’s trust and did what they promised to do, everything would 
be fine, but at any moment they could turn on the customers since the design offered no 
mandated security. 
Audit. Most large hosting companies should be doing routine, comprehensive 
audits of their datacenters. These audits range from examining physical security to 
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checking authentication for datacenter personnel to analyzing redundancy capabilities in 
Internet and power. In hosting contract negotiations, getting the hosting company to show 
the results of their recent audit history can shed light on if that company would be a 
suitable provider for cloud needs. If it has been consistently missing the mark on 
important protections and hasn’t taken steps to improve its position, there is no guarantee 
it will fix the problems once a contract is signed. 
With more rigorous audits, a datacenter can be certified to meet a specific set of 
guidelines necessary for legal compliance in a field. For example, the provider Online 
Tech has audited and certified its datacenters to be HIPAA compliant. (Online Tech, 
2012)  This is just what would be needed to help a small doctor’s practice make a choice 
as to which datacenter they would want to host their office servers. Even though hosting 
companies will not share their exact details of operation, an audit can provide insight to a 
potential client on whether a specific provider is a quality choice. 
Final Thoughts 
Moving a company’s IT to the cloud can bring about huge benefits in terms of 
cost and agility. The problem is that public clouds with outsourced management and 
physical location have an inherent lack of security controls from the client.  These leave 
the possibility of major vulnerabilities that could impact the confidentiality, integrity, 
and/or availability of important company data.  The best solution is to use a hybrid cloud 
and split the sensitive and non-sensitive infrastructure between private and public cloud 
respectively with a closely controlled and monitored connection between the two.  
Finally, extra care should be taken on the public cloud side to mitigate some of the 
weaknesses of the public cloud model.  
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